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Abstract
We develop a framework in which: (i) a ¯rm can have a new product tested publicly before
launch; and (ii) tests vary in toughness, holding expertise ¯xed. Price °exibility boosts the
strong positive impact on consumer beliefs of passing a tough test and mitigates the strong
negative impact of failing a soft test. As a result, pro¯ts are convex in toughness: the
¯rm selects either the toughest or softest test available. The toughest test is optimal when
consumers start with an unfavorable prior and receive su±ciently uninformative private
signals (an \innovative" product); the softest test is optimal when signals are su±ciently
informative.
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Should a software company launching a new product invite a skeptical reviewer to preview the
product or should it restrict previewing opportunities to soft reviewers known to be positively
predisposed towards the company's products? How should the sponsor of a new technology
choose between standard setting organizations of varying toughness ranging from fully indepen-
dent to largely captive? Should a politician seeking election restrict interview opportunities to
media outlets with similar political leanings, or should the politician instead agree to face a
challenging interview with a media outlet from the opposite side of the political spectrum?
In this paper we develop a framework to study such questions. In our framework, a mo-
nopolist can choose to have a new product tested publicly before launching the product on the
market. The ¯rm knows the quality of the new product (either high or low), but is unable
to disclose quality veri¯ably to imperfectly informed consumers. Instead, the ¯rm attempts to
transmit information about quality by selecting among tests which vary in toughness, holding
expertise ¯xed. In selecting the toughness of the test to be faced, the ¯rm trades o® the higher
probability of passing a softer test against the greater impact on consumers' beliefs from passing
a tougher test. The ¯rm also chooses the new product's price, which can be conditioned both on
the publicly known toughness of the chosen test and on the test's pass or fail decision. We want
to discover both what sort of test a monopolist might choose and how the choice of test interacts
with pricing: in short, we want to analyze the best way for the monopolist to use public tests
together with prices to maximize pro¯ts.
In our framework, a monopolist with a low quality product can duplicate costlessly the
actions of a high quality monopolist. As a result, all our equilibria will be pooling so the ¯rm
cannot use the choice of test or price to signal her product quality directly. Nevertheless, tests
play a crucial role in information transmission, not through the choice of test but through the
outcome of the test and the interaction of the test and pricing.
We ¯nd that the monopolist always chooses to have her new product publicly tested before
launch: in fact any test is better than not being tested at all. We also ¯nd that the monopolist
always selects either the toughest or softest public test available to her: the ability to condition
price on the test decision convexi¯es pro¯ts by bolstering the strong positive impact of passing
a tough test and mitigating the strong negative impact of failing a soft test. When consumers
start with an unfavorable prior and receive su±ciently uninformative private signals, which might
correspond to an innovative product about which consumers receive little private information,
the ¯rm chooses the toughest possible test to maximize the impact of passing the test. In that
case, the ¯rm accepts a high risk of failing the test in order to launch her new product with
a bang if she passes. If, on the other hand, consumers' signals are very informative, perhaps
because the type of product is well-known, the softest test is chosen to maximize the probability
1of passing.
Our results can help to shed light on why ¯rms might sometimes choose very tough public
tests or reviewers, while on other occasions they restrict reviewing opportunities to \yes-men". In
Section 5, we link our model and results to two speci¯c applications and discuss the applicability
of our framework to broader situations in which a principal seeks endorsement from a group of
agents and outside certi¯cation of quality is available.
Section 2 describes how our analysis relates to the existing literature. Section 3 outlines
the structure of our model. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 provides discussion and
applications. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Related literature
The literature has paid almost no attention to the use of public tests of varying toughness to
transmit information. Lerner and Tirole (2006) focus on the role of biased technology standard
setting authorities as certi¯ers,1 while Gill and Sgroi (2008) consider the use of biased tests
when agents decide sequentially whether to endorse a principal. Crucially, in these papers there
is no role for prices conditioned on the test's decision: in Lerner and Tirole (2006) the certi¯er's
decision rule is sensitive to any anticipated price response to its decision, while Gill and Sgroi
(2008) study ¯xed-price contexts. We allow pricing °exibility and thereby examine the interplay
between the choice of test and the optimal price, ¯nding that the ability to condition price on the
toughness of the chosen test and on whether the product passes or fails generates the convexity
in the monopolist's pro¯t function which drives the choice of test to an extreme. This completely
overturns the main result in Gill and Sgroi (2008) that a very mildly tough test is best and in
Lerner and Tirole (2006) that the principal prefers the certi¯er most biased in favor of the new
technology, subject to users adopting following certi¯cation. In both cases, the inability to use
price to bolster the impact of passing a tough test or mitigate the impact of failing a soft test
makes very tough or very soft tests unattractive.
The framework studied in Lerner and Tirole (2006) is also di®erent to ours as the principal
is not perfectly informed about the quality of its technology, the chosen certi¯er discovers with
certainty the quality of the technology it is asked to certify and users do not receive any private
information. The framework in Gill and Sgroi (2008) can be seen as a highly simpli¯ed analogue
of the one we study here, but with ¯xed prices. Instead of allowing the distribution of private
beliefs about quality to take any continuous shape as we do, Gill and Sgroi (2008) assume that
their agents start with a common symmetric prior belief equal to the \price" of endorsement and
receive a private signal from a quality-dependent Bernoulli distribution, resulting in a simple
1Chiao et al. (2007) empirically test Lerner and Tirole (2006)'s model, while Farhi et al. (2005) extend the
model to a dynamic setting.
2two-point distribution of private beliefs. The tester receives two signals from the same Bernoulli
distribution from which the agents receive their private signals, and the toughness of the test is
the probability of failing when the tester receives two con°icting signal outcomes. A very mildly
tough test is preferred, as passing such a test is just enough to induce those agents who received
the bad private signal outcome to endorse and so start a cascade on endorsement.
In our set-up testing has no direct cost to the monopolist, so all equilibria are pooling. Thus
we abstract from Spence (1973)-style signaling of quality through the choice of test. Hvide
(2009) studies the case in which a ¯rm can use the choice of test to signal quality directly in the
context of a model with certi¯cation fees and two types of test.
Early pricing and marketing strategy can sometimes play a role similar to tough and soft
tests. For example, Taylor (1999) and Bose et al. (2006, 2008) ¯nd that high initial prices,
whose e®ects are similar to the choice of a tough test, can be optimal. By contrast, in Caminal
and Vives (1996, 1999), in which early prices are unobservable to later consumers, and in Welch
(1992), in which prices cannot be conditioned on the history of purchases, low introductory
prices are preferred. Mikl¶ os-Thal and Zhang (2010) ¯nd that low initial marketing expenditure,
which operates in a way analogous to a soft test by inducing fewer consumers to consider the
product and acquire private signals, can be best.
Some papers consider the use of tests and experts in the absence of a public choice over test
toughness. Ottaviani and Prat (2001) ¯nd that, to reduce a buyer's informational rents, a seller
may wish to use a public signal of quality which is a±liated with the buyer's private information.
Chamley (2004, ch. 10) surveys the literature on self-interested experts, while Strausz (2005)
considers the capture of certi¯cation intermediaries. Sgroi (2002) and Callander and HÄ orner
(2009) consider multiple public decisions made by consumers at the start of a product's life-
cycle which act in a similar way to a public test. Our paper also falls into the broader literature
on the e±ciency of information transmission dating at least from the seminal contribution of
Blackwell (1951). The auction literature, for example, has considered the di®erent information
structures a seller should make available to potential buyers about their heterogeneous valuations
(Bergemann and Pesendorfer, 2007) and how much information buyers should spend to acquire
signals about product quality (Persico, 2000).
Finally, the convexity of pro¯ts in test toughness in our set-up is reminiscent of the ¯ndings in
Lewis and Sappington (1994) and Johnson and Myatt (2006) that a monopolist's pro¯t is convex
in the amount of information released to consumers, so the monopolist will choose to release
either as much or as little information as possible. However, the mechanism in those papers
is di®erent: the monopolist is choosing how much to rotate the demand curve as information
release allows consumers to discover how well the product matches their idiosyncratic tastes.
Our tests, on the other hand, shift demand in and out for consumers who all share the same
preferences and so are learning about objective quality.
33 Model
A monopolist launches a new product aimed at a unit mass of potential consumers with unit
demands. The product's quality v 2 f0;1g is either high (v = 1) or low (v = 0). Consumers are
risk neutral and receive utility v¡p from buying at a price p and zero otherwise. The monopolist
knows the quality of her product, but cannot veri¯ably disclose this information. Normalizing
marginal costs to zero, the monopolist aims to maximize expected revenue.
Each consumer receives a private signal about product quality, de¯ned to be an i.i.d. random
draw from a continuous quality-dependent signal distribution. Each consumer uses her signal
outcome (the realization of her random draw) together with her prior belief to form a private
belief ¼ about the probability that the product is of high quality. We assume that the quality-
dependent cumulative distribution function Fv(¼) over the consumers' private beliefs is known
to the monopolist and is continuous with support [¼;¼], where ¼ > 0 and ¼ < 1 so the beliefs
are bounded and thus no private signal outcome perfectly reveals quality. This formulation
places no particular restriction on the prior beliefs: before they receive their private signals, the
consumers can start with priors which are either common to all consumers or heterogeneous
across consumers.
The monopolist chooses whether or not to subject her new product to a pre-launch public
test. If the monopolist chooses to be tested, the test returns a binary decision d 2 D ´ fP;Fg
where P is a pass and F is a fail.2 The probability of decision d given quality v is given by
qd
v 2 [0;1], with
P
D qd
v = 1, which implies that qP
1 ¡ qP
0 = qF
0 ¡ qF
1 . Conditional on quality, the
test decision is independent of the consumers' private signals. To ensure that a pass is good
news about product quality and that a fail is bad news, we assume that
· ´ qP
1 ¡ qP
0 = qF
0 ¡ qF
1 > 0: (1)
In the language of Milgrom (1981), a pass is \more favorable" news than a fail as the Monotone
Likelihood Ratio Property is satis¯ed. We think of · as measuring the expertise of the test, which
from the monopolist's perspective is ¯xed. However, the monopolist can choose the toughness
of the test, measured by
¿ ´ qF
1 = 1 ¡ qP
1 ; (2)
and the consumers observe this choice of ¿. Given ·, tougher tests are harder to pass, whatever
the product quality: a tougher test implies a higher rate of false negatives (where the high
quality product fails the test) and a lower rate of false positives (where the low quality product
2Modeling a test (or an evaluator) as condensing more complex information into a simple binary decision is a
common assumption in the literature. For example see Calvert (1985), Sah and Stiglitz (1986), Lerner and Tirole
(2006), Demange (2010) and Kwiek (2010). As Calvert (1985, p. 534) puts it: \This feature represents the basic
nature of advice, a distillation of complex reality into a simple recommendation."
4passes). The monopolist chooses ¿ 2 [0;1¡·][N; the softest test has ¿ = 0, while the toughest
test has ¿ = 1 ¡ · given qF
0 · 1, and ¿ = N represents the choice not to be tested. We assume
· < 1; otherwise the toughest and softest tests coincide so the monopolist does not face a choice
of toughness.
The monopolist chooses a price p for her product which can be conditioned on product
quality v, the toughness of the selected test ¿ and, if ¿ 6= N, the test's decision d. After
observing the choice of test ¿, the test's decision d (if ¿ 6= N) and the chosen price p, each
consumer updates her private belief ¼ to form a posterior belief ¼0 about the probability that
the product is of high quality. As each consumer is risk neutral, this posterior belief equals the
consumer's expected utility from purchasing net of the price, so the consumer buys if and only
if ¼0 ¸ p. The consumers make their purchasing decisions simultaneously.
4 Results
4.1 Restriction to high quality monopolist's choice of pooling equilibrium
We solve for perfect Bayesian equilibria, and we restrict attention to pure strategies. In our
framework, a monopolist with a low quality product can duplicate costlessly the actions of
a high quality monopolist. As a result, apart from degenerate separating equilibria in which
the monopolist always earns zero revenue, all equilibria must be pooling. Suppose not: in a
separating equilibrium a monopolist with a low quality product would reveal her quality to be
low the ¯rst time her choice of test ¿ or price p di®ered from that of a monopolist with a high
quality product; at that point, the monopolist would instead prefer to deviate and duplicate the
strategy of the high quality monopolist.3 Thus the monopolist cannot use the choice of test or
price to signal her product quality directly, and so we focus attention on the direct role of the
test itself in transmitting information to the consumers, who learn only from the test decision.
We restrict attention to the pooling equilibria in which, conditional on pooling, the mo-
nopolist with a high quality product chooses her preferred test ¿ and conditional pricing rule.
Such equilibria can be supported by the o®-equilibrium belief that a deviator's product is of low
quality. These pooling equilibria are appealing as it is the low quality monopolist which would
like to masquerade as the high quality monopolist, and not the reverse. Indeed, such pooling
equilibria are the only strongly undefeated perfect Bayesian equilibria.4
3For simplicity, we do not consider mixed strategy equilibria; however, if we allowed mixed strategies, semi-
separating equilibria in which one type of monopolist mixed and the other did not at a particular choice would
be ruled out.
4Strongly undefeated perfect Bayesian equilibrium (SUPBE), due to Mezzetti and Tsoulouhas (2000), is a
variant of Mailath et al. (1993)'s undefeated perfect Bayesian equilibrium. If other pooling equilibria were strongly
undefeated, a deviation consistent with one of the high quality monopolist's preferred pooling equilibria would
always weakly increase consumer beliefs that the deviator's product was of high quality, which would give the
high quality monopolist an incentive to deviate. The high quality monopolist's preferred pooling equilibria are
strongly undefeated as the o®-equilibrium belief that a deviator's product is of low quality is consistent with
SUPBE.
54.2 Deriving the revenue function
We now derive the high quality monopolist's revenue function, conditional on pooling. If the
monopolist chooses to be tested, using Bayes' Rule the posterior belief of a consumer with private
belief ¼ 2 [¼;¼] after observing a test decision d is given by:
¼0 =
qd
1¼
qd
1¼ + qd
0(1 ¡ ¼)
: (3)
After a test pass (d = P), the posterior belief is given by:
¼0 =
qP
1 ¼
qP
1 ¼ + qP
0 (1 ¡ ¼)
=
(1 ¡ ¿)¼
(1 ¡ ¿)¼ + (1 ¡ ¿ ¡ ·)(1 ¡ ¼)
2 (¼;1]: (4)
For the toughest test (¿ = 1 ¡ ·), a pass reveals the quality to be high for sure, so ¼0 = 1;
passing any other test leaves ¼0 2 (¼;1). After a test fail (d = F), the posterior belief is given
by:
¼0 =
qF
1 ¼
qF
1 ¼ + qF
0 (1 ¡ ¼)
=
¿¼
¿¼ + (¿ + ·)(1 ¡ ¼)
2 [0;¼): (5)
For the softest test (¿ = 0), a fail reveals the quality to be low for sure, so ¼0 = 0; failing any
other test leaves ¼0 2 (0;¼). If the monopolist chooses not to be tested, the consumers' private
beliefs are unaltered so ¼0 = ¼.
After a test decision d, the monopolist can sell to the proportion of consumers 1 ¡ F1(¼)
whose private beliefs are at least as good as ¼ by setting price p equal to the posterior belief ¼0
of a consumer whose private belief exactly equals ¼. Thus, conditional on the test decision d,
maximal revenue for a high quality monopolist is given by:5
max
¼ ¼0(1 ¡ F1(¼)) = max
¼
qd
1¼
qd
1¼ + qd
0(1 ¡ ¼)
(1 ¡ F1(¼)): (6)
A high quality monopolist who chooses to be tested anticipates the impact of the chosen test
toughness ¿ and test decision d on her pricing decision, and therefore selects test toughness
¿ 2 [0;1 ¡ ·] to maximize expected revenue across both possible test decisions, given by:
R =
X
D
qd
1 max
¼
qd
1¼
qd
1¼ + qd
0(1 ¡ ¼)
(1 ¡ F1(¼)) =
X
D
max
¼
¡
qd
1
¢2 ¼(1 ¡ F1(¼))
qd
1¼ + qd
0(1 ¡ ¼)
: (7)
If the high quality monopolist chooses not to be tested, ¼0 = ¼ so she will sell to a proportion
1 ¡ F1(¼) of consumers by setting price p = ¼. Thus her maximal revenue is given by:
R = max
¼
¼(1 ¡ F1(¼)): (8)
5After passing the toughest test, maximal revenue is one at price one as ¼
0 = 1 for all ¼: maximizing ¼
0(1 ¡
F1(¼)) in (6) by setting ¼ = ¼ returns this revenue. The high quality monopolist never fails the softest test, so
the maximization problem is not relevant for that case.
64.3 Choosing to be tested
Our ¯rst substantive result is that the monopolist will always choose to subject a new product
to a pre-launch public test.
Proposition 1. The monopolist always opts to have a new product tested publicly before launch.
The result is intuitive. In expectation, a test reveals good information about a high quality
product, so the monopolist who knows her product quality to be high is keen for consumers to
have this information. A low quality monopolist is then forced to face a test to avoid revealing
low quality by refusing to be tested. In fact, the proof of Proposition 1 shows that, conditional
on pooling, the high quality monopolist strictly prefers any test type to not having her new
product tested at all before launch.
4.4 Choice of test toughness
Our second result shows that, despite being able to select from a continuum of test types, the
monopolist is better o® choosing either the softest possible public test (¿ = 0) or the toughest
possible public test (¿ = 1 ¡ ·). The result holds true whatever the level of test expertise ·.
The toughest test is sometimes best even though in our framework the monopolist cannot use
the choice of a tough test to signal quality directly.
Proposition 2. For any level of test expertise, the monopolist always selects either the toughest
public test or the softest public test.
When choosing which test to face before launching her new product on the market, the
monopolist faces a clear trade-o®. On the one hand selecting a tougher test reduces the proba-
bility of passing. On the other hand, because consumers understand that a tougher test is more
strongly biased against the product, a tougher test has a stronger positive impact on consumers'
posterior beliefs in the event of a pass and a smaller negative impact in the event of a fail. The
monopolist's pricing °exibility allows her to set an optimal price given the post-test distribution
of posterior consumer beliefs: this bolsters the strong positive impact of passing a tough test and
mitigates the strong negative impact of failing a soft test, and pushes the monopolist towards
either the toughest or softest possible test.
The proof works by showing that the high quality monopolist's expected revenue, given by
(7), is convex in test toughness. Consumers' Bayesian updating gives rise to posterior beliefs in
the event of a pass that increase convexly in test toughness (note that
qP
1
qP
0
= 1¡¿
1¡¿¡·, the ratio
of the probability of passing conditional on the product being of high quality to the probability
of passing conditional on low quality, increases convexly in test toughness ¿). The monopolist's
pricing °exibility allows her to take advantage of this convexity, so revenue in the event of a
pass increases faster and faster as the test becomes very tough and falls more and more slowly
7as the test becomes very soft. Thus the probability of passing (which falls linearly in toughness)
times maximal revenue in the event of a pass is also convex in test toughness. The other part
of the revenue function arising from a test fail can also shown to be convex, and summing over
the pass and fail cases gives an overall expected revenue function that is convex.
The convexity of revenue in test toughness implies that Proposition 2 extends to the case
where the monopolist cannot choose from the whole continuum of test types but must instead
select from a restricted subset of tests.
Corollary to Proposition 2. If the monopolist has to choose the toughness of the public test
from a restricted and/or discrete set, she continues to select either the toughest test or the softest
test in the available set.
This corollary tells us that the optimality of the toughest or softest available public test is
not driven by the extreme nature of the optimal test in Proposition 2. The corollary also extends
the applicability of our ¯ndings to realistic scenarios in which a full continuum of test types is
not always available.
4.5 Pairwise comparison
We have just seen that, before launching her new product on the market, the monopolist always
chooses either the toughest or softest public test. For any particular level of test expertise
· and distribution of private beliefs conditional on high quality F1(¼), using (7) a pairwise
comparison of expected revenues determines whether the toughest or softest test is best. To
maintain generality we have imposed no structure on the distribution of private beliefs, and
so we cannot in general discover which of the two tests is best. Nonetheless, we are able to
determine the optimal choice when the consumers' private signals are su±ciently informative or
uninformative.
We now suppose that, before receiving their private signals, the consumers share a common
prior belief ° about the probability that the product is of high quality. A common prior belief is a
standard assumption in models of observational learning (see, for instance, Smith and S¿rensen,
2000). We also assume that the lower bound on the consumers' private beliefs ¼ < 1
2 and that
the upper bound on private beliefs ¼ > 1
2, and we denote the mean private belief by ¹. We say
that the private signals become more informative as the mean private belief ¹ rises towards ¼
conditional on the product being of high quality and falls towards ¼ conditional on the product
being of low quality. We say that the private signals become less informative as the mean private
belief ¹ tends towards the common prior belief ° and the variance of the private beliefs falls
towards zero. The following proposition describes the optimal choice of test toughness when
private signals are su±ciently informative or uninformative.
8Proposition 3.
(a) When the consumers' private signals become su±ciently informative, the monopolist
selects the softest public test.
(b) When the consumers' private signals become su±ciently uninformative, the monopolist:
(i) selects the toughest public test if the prior belief ° < 1
2; and (ii) selects the softest public test
if the prior belief ° > 1
2.
The advantage of the softest test is the high probability of passing, while the advantage of
the toughest test is the strong positive impact of a pass on consumers' posterior beliefs, and
hence on revenue given the monopolist's ability to condition price on the test result. When
consumers' private signals are uninformative and the consumers start with an unfavorable prior
about product quality (case b.i), the monopolist values the big upward impact on beliefs from
passing the toughest possible test. This might correspond to an innovative product about
which consumers receive little private information: by choosing the toughest test the monopolist
attempts to launch such a new product with a \baptism of ¯re".
When instead consumers' private signals are very informative (case a), or the private signals
are uninformative but the consumers start with a favorable prior (case b.ii), the high quality
monopolist understands that the consumers will tend to hold favorable private beliefs about
quality before observing the test result (remember from Section 4.1 that we are considering
the choice of the high quality monopolist, conditional on pooling). Thus there is little upside
from risking the toughest test as the scope for beliefs to rise is limited; instead the monopolist
plumps for the softest public test possible. This might correspond to a well-known type of
product about which consumers receive clear private signals or towards which the consumers
are positively predisposed.
5 Applications and discussion
Although we couch our model in terms of a monopolist launching a new product, our framework
applies more broadly to situations in which a principal attempts to receive endorsements from a
group of agents. For our framework to apply, the principal must be able to seek an outside test
of quality (such as a review or certi¯cation decision), potential tests must vary in their toughness
and the principal must be able to adjust the \price" of endorsement to the test result. Examples
described by Lerner and Tirole (2006) include the sponsor of a new technology attempting
to receive certi¯cation from standard setting organizations ranging from fully independent to
largely captive or an issuer of stocks or bonds seeking to be certi¯ed by investment banks and
rating agencies which di®er in their reputation and independence, where \price" is measured by
the terms o®ered to end users or investors. Below we describe in more detail two applications
of our model, the ¯rst to a standard monopoly ¯rm context and the second to a politician
9seeking election. Of course, as is the case for all models, we do not capture every feature of
reality; in particular, we abstract from the use of pre-launch reviews to increase awareness of
a new product, from any competition between products and from the use of multiple testing
opportunities (although our model does apply to the ¯nal such opportunity by incorporating
previous test decisions in the consumers' private beliefs). Nonetheless, we believe that our results
provide insights relevant to the examples described below.
Our ¯rst application focuses on the computer software industry, in which companies often
approach magazines or websites to preview new releases. These magazines or websites typically
have a known toughness: for example, video games websites often list the results of previews
and give some indication of the reviewer's toughness. The outcome of previews a®ects sales
(particularly in the pre-order market) and prices. Microsoft provides a particularly interesting
case study. In 2009, Microsoft chose to launch Windows 7 with a very soft test: initially all
information about Windows 7 came through o±cial Microsoft sources, followed by an early
preview (two months prior to the release of the beta version) by Paul Thurrott, the well-known
pro-Microsoft blogger (on his website \SuperSite for Windows") and editor of Windows IT Pro
Magazine. This case seems to match the assumptions of Proposition 3.a quite well: Windows
7 was similar to earlier well-known versions of the Windows operating system, so it seems
reasonable to assume that the potential market had accurate private information about its
quality. In contrast, Microsoft selected a very tough test when in 2003 it launched a PC version
of the hit Xbox game \Halo" developed in collaboration with Gearbox Software: the popular
review site GameSpy was invited to preview the PC version of the game, even though GameSpy
was one of the few review sites that did not award the original Xbox version of Halo near perfect
marks (in fact GameSpy listed the Xbox version as one of the \25 most overrated games of all
time"). This case seems to match the assumptions of Proposition 3.b.i quite well as PC owners
who might consider buying the game likely had weak private information concerning its quality.
First, most of the the potential market would not have owned the Xbox version. Second, the
original Xbox version was developed by a di®erent company, Bungie, so Gearbox's ability to
convert successfully the game for the PC was in doubt.
Our second application considers politicians seeking election. Should such a politician face
a soft test by interviewing with a media outlet sharing similar political leanings, or should the
politician instead face a tough test by agreeing to a challenging interview with a media outlet
from the opposite side of the political spectrum? After facing such a test, the politician can raise
or lower the \price" of endorsement for undecided centrist voters by moving her policy position
further away from or toward the center. The decision by the 2008 Republican vice-presidential
candidate Sarah Palin to agree to an exclusive interview with Katie Couric at CBS, a station with
a known bias to the left of Palin's own leanings, provides an interesting case study. Sarah Palin
was picked by John McCain as his running mate from the relative obscurity of the Governorship
10of Alaska. As such, undecided centrist voters likely had weak private information about her
qualities, making a tough test attractive. In the event, the interview on September 24th 2008
was widely acknowledged to be a failure throughout the media: the risk did not pay o®. Even
among the conservative media the feeling was negative: National Review editor Rich Lowry
called Palin's performance \dreadful" (National Review, September 27th 2008), while former
Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee stated that \It was not a good interview. I'm
being charitable" (Esquire magazine, January 14th 2009). Nevertheless, in the light of poor
polling through September, choosing to be interviewed by CBS may well have been the correct
action even though in hindsight it went badly.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we provide an integration of two key choices for a monopolist hoping to convince
consumers that she is o®ering a product worth buying: the choice of price, and the use of public
testing as an early marketing strategy. Quite apart from any standard signaling arguments, we
have found that a monopolist will tend to choose tests that are publicly known to be extremely
tough or soft. Despite tough tests being di±cult to pass, the tremendous gains when a pass
is obtained might be enough to make them popular. On the other hand, we can also better
understand the popularity of friendly referees, soft review journals or easy reviewers. Avoiding
the testing process altogether is not optimal, so testing is a complement to optimal pricing.
Finally, we do not wish to draw attention away from other reasons to be tested (such as
to provide factual information about the product and its imminent launch) or other possible
methods to signal quality (such as a commitment to a low price if the demand is low, o®ering
guarantees of product quality where this is cheaply veri¯able, etc.). Future work might examine
the interaction between these motivations and methods and those detailed in this paper.
11Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Remember from Section 4.1 that we consider the high quality mo-
nopolist's choice of test and price, conditional on pooling. Let ¼¤ be a ¼ 2 [¼;¼] which maximizes
¼(1¡F1(¼)), and so from (8) is an optimal price for a high quality monopolist who chooses not
to be tested. Clearly, ¼¤(1 ¡ F1(¼¤)) > 0. Suppose that the monopolist chooses to be tested
and that, conditional on the test decision d, she must set a price p at the posterior belief of a
consumer with private belief ¼¤. Adapting (7), her expected revenue would be given by:6
R =
X
D
(qd
1)
2
¼¤(1¡F1(¼¤))
qd
1¼¤+qd
0(1¡¼¤) : (9)
Using (1) and qd
v ¸ 0, and since ¼¤ 2 (0;1) given the bounds on private beliefs, both denomina-
tors in (9) are strictly positive. Furthermore, qF
v = 1 ¡ qP
v . Thus, for any test toughness, this
revenue is strictly greater than ¼¤(1 ¡ F1(¼¤)), the revenue of the monopolist who chooses not
to be tested, if and only if:
¡
qP
1
¢2 ¡¡
1 ¡ qP
1
¢
¼¤ +
¡
1 ¡ qP
0
¢
(1 ¡ ¼¤)
¢
+
¡
1 ¡ qP
1
¢2 ¡
qP
1 ¼¤ + qP
0 (1 ¡ ¼¤)
¢
> (10)
qP
1
¡
1 ¡ qP
1
¢
(¼¤)
2 + qP
0
¡
1 ¡ qP
0
¢
(1 ¡ ¼¤)
2 +
¡
qP
1
¡
1 ¡ qP
0
¢
+ qP
0
¡
1 ¡ qP
1
¢¢
¼¤ (1 ¡ ¼¤): (11)
Re-arranging, this collapses to
¡
qP
1 ¡ qP
0
¢2 (1¡¼¤)2 > 0. From (1), qP
1 ¡qP
0 > 0. Also, ¼¤ 2 (0;1)
from above. Thus, when her pricing °exibility is restricted, the high quality monopolist strictly
prefers any test toughness to not being tested. She therefore also strictly prefers any test
toughness when she can set an optimal price, which in turn implies that she must strictly prefer
to be tested when she can choose an optimal test toughness and price.
Proof of Proposition 2. We start by showing that
(qd
1)
2
¼(1¡F1(¼))
qd
1¼+qd
0(1¡¼) (12)
is always convex in test toughness ¿, and is strictly convex for ¼ < ¼. Using (4) and (5):
(qP
1 )
2
¼(1¡F1(¼))
qP
1 ¼+qP
0 (1¡¼) =
(1¡¿)2¼(1¡F1(¼))
(1¡¿)¼+(1¡¿¡·)(1¡¼) =
(1¡¿)2¼(1¡F1(¼))
(1¡¿)¡·(1¡¼) ; (13)
(qF
1 )
2
¼(1¡F1(¼))
qF
1 ¼+qF
0 (1¡¼) =
¿2¼(1¡F1(¼))
¿¼+(¿+·)(1¡¼) =
¿2¼(1¡F1(¼))
¿+·(1¡¼) : (14)
Given (1) and ¿ 2 [0;1¡·] so 1¡¿ ¸ ·, and since ¼ 2 (0;1) given the bounds on private beliefs,
the denominators of (13) and (14) are always strictly positive and their second derivatives with
6Under the toughest test, this expression understates revenue as when such a test is passed, the monopolist
will sell to all consumers at p = ¼
0 = 1, rather than to a proportion 1 ¡ F1(¼
¤) (see footnote 5); the argument is
una®ected as we show that even this lower revenue beats the revenue from not being tested.
12respect to ¿ are, respectively:
2·2(1¡¼)2¼(1¡F1(¼))
((1¡¿)¡·(1¡¼))3 ¸ 0 and
2·2(1¡¼)2¼(1¡F1(¼))
(¿+·(1¡¼))3 ¸ 0: (15)
When ¼ < ¼, so F(¼) > 0, the second derivatives are strictly positive.
Remember from Section 4.1 that we consider the high quality monopolist's choice of test and
price, conditional on pooling. Note that (12) is continuous in ¼, so at least one ¼ 2 [¼;¼] must
maximize (12). The maximum of convex functions is convex, as is their sum, so the convexity
of (12) implies that expected revenue (7) is also convex in test toughness ¿. Thus the high
quality monopolist must weakly prefer either the toughest test (¿ = 1 ¡ ·) or the softest test
(¿ = 0), or both, to any other test toughness.
We can show a strict preference by proving that starting from any interior ¿ 2 (0;1¡·) the
monopolist could increase expected revenue. Let ¼¤(¿;d) be a ¼ 2 [¼;¼] which maximizes (12)
given a test toughness ¿ and test decision d, and let e ¿ be a particular interior ¿. If the monopolist
moved ¿ to another interior value away from e ¿, but, conditional on the test decision d, set price
p at the posterior belief of a consumer with private belief ¼¤(e ¿;d), adapting (7) her expected
revenue would be given by:
X
D
(qd
1)
2
¼¤(e ¿;d)(1¡F1(¼¤(e ¿;d)))
qd
1¼¤(e ¿;d)+qd
0(1¡¼¤(e ¿;d)) : (16)
The discussion around (4) and (5) shows that, unless ¿ = 0, a consumer's posterior belief
¼0 =
qd
1¼
qd
1¼+qd
0(1¡¼) > 0 for all private beliefs ¼ 2 [¼;¼]. Thus ¼¤(e ¿;d) < ¼: any ¼ < ¼ gives
revenue ¼0(1¡F1(¼)) > 0, while ¼ = ¼ gives ¼0(1¡F1(¼)) = 0 as F(¼) = 1. The strict convexity
of (12) for ¼ < ¼ found above then implies that (16) is strictly convex in ¿. Restricting her
pricing °exibility, the monopolist could therefore strictly increase expected revenue by moving
¿ in an appropriate direction, and so she must be able to increase revenue when she can set an
optimal price.
Proof of Corollary to Proposition 2. Suppose the monopolist has to choose test toughness
¿ 2 [¿;¿] with ¿ ¸ 0 and ¿ · 1 ¡ ·. The proof of Proposition 2 continues to work, replacing
the lower bound ¿ = 0 with ¿ and the upper bound ¿ = 1 ¡ · with ¿, and letting interior ¿ lie
in (¿;¿). If we replace [¿;¿] with a discrete set with the same end points, the strict preference
for the toughest or softest test in the set must remain.
Proof of Proposition 3. We split the proof into three parts. First, we state and prove
Lemma 1. We then use the lemma to prove parts (a) and (b) in turn.
Lemma 1. As the variance of the consumers' private beliefs tends to zero and the mean private
belief tends to some value b ¹, in the limit the monopolist selects the toughest test if b ¹ < 1
2 and
selects the softest test if b ¹ > 1
2.
13Part 1: Proof of Lemma 1. Remember from Section 4.1 that we consider the high quality
monopolist's choice, conditional on pooling. If the high quality monopolist chooses the softest
test (¿ = 0), she passes the test for sure (qP
1 = 1 ¡ ¿ = 1), so using (4) and (6) her maximal
revenue is given by:
R(¿ = 0) = max
¼
¼
¼+(1¡·)(1¡¼)(1 ¡ F1(¼)): (17)
If she chooses the toughest test (¿ = 1¡·), with probability qP
1 = 1¡¿ = · she passes the test,
in which case from (4) all consumers share a posterior belief ¼0 = 1 as they are convinced the
product is of high quality, so maximal revenue is one at price one. With probability 1 ¡ · the
monopolist fails the test. Using (5) and (6) her expected revenue is therefore given by:
R(¿ = 1 ¡ ·) = · + (1 ¡ ·)max
¼
(1¡·)¼
(1¡·)¼+(1¡¼)(1 ¡ F1(¼)): (18)
As the variance of ¼ in F1(¼) tends to zero and its mean tend to b ¹ 2 [¼;¼], F1(¼) ! 0 for
all ¼ < b ¹. Thus in the limit, after passing the softest test or failing the toughest test, the
monopolist can achieve revenue arbitrarily close to that from selling to all consumers at price
equal to the posterior of a consumer with private belief ¼ = b ¹ by setting price just below this
level (or at this level if b ¹ = ¼). The monopolist cannot do better than this: in the limit, for any
¼ > b ¹ the proportion of consumers purchasing goes to zero. Thus,
· +
(1¡·)2b ¹
(1¡·)b ¹+(1¡b ¹) ?
b ¹
b ¹+(1¡·)(1¡b ¹) (19)
implies that, in the limit, R(¿ = 1 ¡ ·) ? R(¿ = 0). From Section 3, · 2 (0;1), and b ¹ 2 (0;1)
given the bounds on private beliefs. Some algebra then shows that
(19) , ·(1 ¡ ·)(1 ¡ b ¹)(1 ¡ 2b ¹) ? 0 , b ¹ 7 1
2; (20)
giving the lemma. ¤
Part 2: Proof Proposition 3(a). When the consumers' private signals become su±ciently
informative, by de¯nition the mean private belief tends to ¼, which implies that the variance of
the beliefs tends to zero. Thus, the result follows immediately from Lemma 1 given ¼ > 1
2. ¤
Part 3: Proof of Proposition 3(b). When the consumers' private signals become su±ciently
uninformative, by de¯nition the mean private belief tends to the common prior belief and the
variance of the beliefs tends to zero. Thus, the result follows immediately from Lemma 1. ¤
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